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 Abstract: We examine some basic data on the evolution of aggregate short 
interest, both during the dot-com era, and at other times in history.  Total short interest 
moves in a countercyclical fashion.  For example, short interest in NASDAQ stocks 
actually declines as the NASDAQ index approaches its peak.  Moreover, this decline 
does not seem to reflect a substitution away from outright short-selling and towards put 
options, as the ratio of put-to-call volume displays the same countercyclical tendency.  
The evidence suggests that: i) arbitrageurs are reluctant to bet against  aggregate 
mispricings; and ii) short-selling does not play a particularly helpful role in stabilizing the 
overall stock market. 
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  The spectacular rise and fall of stock prices during the recent dot-com bubble 
period has been accompanied by a surge of interest in the topic of short-selling.  For the 
most part, this work is cross-sectional in nature, examining the causes and consequences 
of short-sales constraints at the individual-stock level, and it suggests the following two 
broad conclusions.  First, consistent with the notion that short-selling is undertaken by 
rational arbitrageurs, the demand for short positions is greatest among stocks that appear 
to be overvalued—e.g., stocks that have high ratios of prices to book value.  Second, 
because of frictions in the market for borrowing stock, as well as various institutional 
rigidities, arbitrage by would-be short-sellers is incomplete.  Thus those stocks where the 
demand for shorting is greatest (as measured, say, by a high premium paid to borrow the 
stock for the purposes of short-selling) tend to have abnormally low future returns.
1   
  Less attention has been paid to variation over time in aggregate short interest, and 
to the role that this might have in countering market-wide sentiment.  Casual intuition 
might suggest that short-selling-based arbitrage would be more effective along the 
aggregate dimension than it is in the cross-section.  After all, while it can be difficult at 
any point in time to short a minority of very overpriced stocks, most stocks are easily and 
cheaply shorted.  Moreover, there are other ways to get a short bet down on the aggregate 
market—for example, by purchasing put options on various indices.  
  It turns out that this intuition is off the mark.  We examine some basic data on the 
evolution of aggregate short interest, both during the dot-com era, and at other times in 
history.  In a striking contrast to the patterns seen in the cross-section, total short interest 
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moves in a countercyclical fashion.  For example, short interest in NASDAQ stocks 
actually declines as the NASDAQ index approaches its peak.  Moreover, this decline 
does not seem to reflect a substitution away from outright short-selling and towards put 
options: the ratio of put-to-call volume displays the same countercyclical tendency.  As 
we discuss below, the evidence is perhaps most consistent with Andrei Shleifer and 
Robert Vishny (1997), who argue that the open-end nature of most professional arbitrage 
firms (i.e., the fact that investors can withdraw their funds on demand) makes it difficult 
for these firms to buck aggregate mispricings.  The evidence also suggests that short-
selling does not play a particularly helpful role in stabilizing the overall stock market. 
 
  I.  The Data 
  A.  The Dot-Com Bubble   
  Figure 1 tells our basic story for the dot-com period.  We plot three series on a 
monthly basis over the interval 1995-2002: i) the NASDAQ index (CRSP’s total return 
index); ii) the value-weighted short-interest ratio (100 times the market value of shares 
sold short, divided by the value of shares outstanding) for all NASDAQ companies; and 
iii) the 60-day moving average of the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s (CBOE) daily 
put-call ratio.  The put-call ratio is the total CBOE trading volume in puts—including 
both index options as well as options on individual NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX 
stocks—divided by the volume in calls, and we use it as an admittedly noisy proxy for 
the magnitude of shorting done via options.  This ratio averaged about 0.7 during the 
period; we have multiplied it by four in the figure so as to fit it on the same scale as the 
short-interest ratio.   3
  As can be seen, both the short-interest ratio and the put-call ratio decline 
substantially as the NASDAQ index explodes upward from mid-1998 to its peak in 
March of 2000; they both then rebound sharply as the index collapses over the 
subsequent two years.  Some simple statistics confirm the visual impressions from the 
figure.  The return on the index over the prior twelve months has a correlation of –0.54 
with the short-interest ratio; and a correlation of –0.63 with the put-call ratio.  (The short-
interest ratio and the put-call ratio are themselves highly positively correlated, at 0.58, 
suggesting that these two measures are capturing similar information.)   
Aside from these time-series patterns, it is also worth noting that remarkably little 
short-selling takes place at any point in the cycle.  In the case of the NASDAQ, the short-
interest ratio averages 2.53 percent over our sample period, and never breaks four 
percent. 
 
  B.  Short-Selling on the NYSE, 1960-2002 
  For a longer historical perspective, we examine NYSE data from 1960 to 2002.  
Because of both data availability and institutional differences, we use an alternative 
measure of short-selling.  One issue is that we have better data here on short-selling 
volume than open interest.  A second is that on the NYSE, unlike the NASDAQ, a large 
fraction of shorting is due to specialists, who are engaged in high-frequency hedging.  So 
the measure we use is total shares sold short by public investors (as opposed to by NYSE 
member firms) divided by total share volume, which we term the short-sales ratio, and 
which we can calculate on an annual basis.   4
  The NYSE short-sales ratio trends sharply upwards during this period (rising from 
1.2 percent in 1960 to 6.6 percent in 2002), perhaps reflecting the growing popularity of 
hedge funds and other long-short strategies.  Thus we look at the change in the short-sales 
ratio.  In Figure 2, we plot this change against the annual return to the value-weighted 
NYSE stock index.  The two series move strongly counter to one another—the 
correlation coefficient is –0.51, which is highly statistically significant. So overall, this 
longer stretch of history tells much the same story as Figure 1 does for the dot-com era.
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  II.  Implications 
  The evidence suggests that aggregate short interest displays extrapolative 
behavior—i.e., it looks like fewer investors are willing to bet on the market going down 
after a period in which it has been rising.  But this characterization raises a puzzle.   
Recall that at the individual-stock level, short interest appears to be contrarian in nature, 
with high-priced stocks attracting more attention from short-sellers.  So why does the 
cross section of shorting seem to reflect the actions of rational arbitrageurs, while the 
aggregate time series seems to reflect the actions of naïve trend-chasers? 
  One potential answer has to do with the open-end nature of professional money 
management.  Consider an example in the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  Suppose 
there are a set of hedge funds that specialize in short-selling.  The managers of these 
funds are rational arbitrageurs, so at any point in time, they will use the capital they have 
to target a portfolio of the most overvalued companies—hence the pattern of shorting in 
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the cross section.  But when the market rises, the short-selling funds will lose money, and 
hence will face redemptions from their clients.  These redemptions (i.e., the well-known 
“performance-flow” relationship) may have their roots in either rational updating about 
hedge-fund-manager ability, or in some degree of irrational trend-chasing on the part of 
end investors.  But in either case, the result is that fund managers have less capital to 
work with in a rising market, and are forced to scale back their aggregate short positions. 
  The broad message is that because of the pervasiveness of open-ending, 
professional arbitrage may be even less effective at countering market-wide sentiment 
shocks than it is at enforcing rational pricing in the cross section.   This can be true even 
though the most obvious direct impediments to arbitrage (e.g., individual stocks being 
hard to borrow) arise in the cross section.
3   
  Of course, this line of discussion raises another question: if open-ending is such a 
handicap for arbitrageurs when it comes to dealing with market-wide sentiment, why is 
the open-end form so common?  On the one hand, it seems clear that open-ending is a 
natural response to problems of agency and asymmetric information.  Investors worry 
about turning over their money to somebody who may turn out to be incompetent or 
crooked,  and so attach value to an early-liquidation option.  Yet it does not follow that 
the degree of open-ending that we observe is one that serves investors well.  Stein (2003) 
argues that competition among money managers for investors’ dollars creates an 
externality, and can lead to a socially excessive amount of open-ending.  When any one 
fund open-ends, it compromises its own ability to undertake certain kinds of arbitrage 
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(which is both a private and social cost), but it makes itself more attractive to investors, 
and thereby steals business from other funds (which is a private, but not a social gain). 
  This general perspective on the constraints faced by professional money managers 
is helpful in thinking about the arbitrage role played by non-financial firms.  In contrast 
to the behavior documented above, non-financials were, effectively, enormous short-
sellers during the bubble period, via issues of their own shares—the dollar volume of 
initial public offerings and seasoned equity offerings peaked at roughly the same time as 
the NASDAQ index.  In rationalizing this fact, one probably does not want to take the 
position that non-financial managers are shrewder or better-informed than, e.g., hedge-
fund managers, particularly with respect to market-wide movements in prices.  A more 
plausible explanation has to do with a comparative institutional advantage.  A non-
financial manager who issues equity at the time of a market peak does so in the closed-
end corporate form, and without being subject to mark-to-market accounting.  So if the 
market continues to go up, she will not record a loss, and she will certainly not be faced 
with the threat of liquidation. 
  As a final point, our data shed some light on the tendency for short-sellers to 
come under political attack in the aftermath of large market declines.  Jones and Lamont 
(2002) discuss the crackdown on short-selling after the crash of 1929, and note that 
numerous anti-shorting regulations stem from this period, including the uptick rule, as 
well as the Investment Company Act of 1940, which placed severe restrictions on the 
ability of mutual funds to go short.  It is clear from Figures 1 and 2 that aggregate short-
selling tends to increase in bear markets, which perhaps makes it all the easier for people 
to blame the messenger.  However, according to our interpretation of this evidence, the   7
problem is not too much short-selling in falling markets—recall that the aggregate 
volume of short interest is always quite small in absolute terms—but rather, too little in 
rising markets.  If this view is correct, any regulatory efforts to constrain short-selling are 
likely to be misguided.   8
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 Figure 1 
NASDAQ Index, NASDAQ Short Interest Ratio, and CBOE Put-Call Ratio,  
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Figure 2 
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